Employment generation is crucial to spreading the benefits of economic growth broadly and to reducing global poverty. And yet, emerging economies face a contemporary challenge to traditional pathways to employment generation: automation, digitalization, and labor-saving technologies. 1.8 billion jobs-or two-thirds of the current labor force of developing countries-are estimated to be susceptible to automation from today's technological standpoint. Cumulative advances in industrial automation and labor-saving technologies could further exacerbate this trend. Or will they? In this paper we: (i) discuss the literature on automation; and in doing so (ii) discuss definitions and determinants of automation in the context of theories of economic development; (iii) assess the empirical estimates of employment-related impacts of automation; (iv) characterize the potential public policy responses to automation; and (v) highlight areas for further exploration in terms of employment and economic development strategies in developing countries. In an adaption of the Lewis model of economic development, the paper uses a simple framework in which the potential for automation creates "unlimited supplies of artificial labor" particularly in the agricultural and industrial sectors due to technological feasibility. This is likely to create a push force for labor to move into the service sector, leading to a bloating of service-sector employment and wage stagnation but not to mass unemployment, at least in the short-to-medium term.
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Executive summary
Automation is likely to affect developing countries in different ways to the way automation affects high-income countries. The poorer a country is, the more jobs it has that are in principle automatable because the kinds of jobs common in developing countries-such as routine agricultural work-are substantially more susceptible to automation than the service jobs-which require creative work or face-to-face interaction-that dominate highincome economies. This matters because employment generation is crucial to spreading the benefits of economic growth broadly and to reducing global poverty.
We argue that the rise of a global 'robot reserve army' will have profound effects on labor markets and structural transformation in developing countries, but rather than causing mass unemployment, AI and robots are more likely to lead to stagnant wages and deindustrialisation. As agricultural and manufacturing jobs are automated, workers will continue to flood the service sector, driving down wages. This will itself hinder poverty reduction and likely put upward pressure on national inequality, weakening the povertyreducing power of growth, and potentially placing the existing social contract under strain, or even possibly limiting the emergence of more inclusive social contracts. How developing countries should respond in terms of public policy is a crucial question, affecting not only middle-income developing countries, but even the very poorest countries given the automation trends in agriculture.
Concerns about the effect of technology on jobs are not new to AI or automation. We argue that the current debate focuses too much on technological capabilities, and not enough on the economic, political, legal, and social factors that will profoundly shape the way automation affects employment. Questions like profitability, labor regulations, unionization, and corporate-social expectations will be at least as important as technical constraints in determining which jobs get automated, especially in developing countries.
Developing countries face several policy challenges unleashed by automation. Given the pace of technological change, upskilling strategies are likely not to be a panacea. Safety nets and wage subsidies may be desirable, but the question remains how to finance them (without making labor more costly and thus exacerbating a trend towards replacement). Investing in labor-heavy sectors such as infrastructure construction, social, education or healthcare provision may be a way for developing countries to manage disruptive impacts of automation though these would imply major public investments and do not in themselves substitute for a long run strategy for economic development.
Introduction
A specter is haunting the industrialized and developing world-the specter of automation. 1.8bn jobs or two-thirds of the current labor force of developing countries are estimated to be susceptible to automation from today's technological standpoint, according to the World Bank (2016) . Employment generation is crucial to spreading the benefits of economic growth broadly and to reducing global poverty. And yet, emerging economies face a contemporary challenge to traditional pathways to employment generation: automation, digitalization, and labor-saving technologies.
A broad range of international agencies have recently flagged such issues relating to the future of employment, and the consequences of automation and deindustrialization in their global reports (ADB, 2018; Hallward-Driemeier and Nayyar, 2017; ILO, 2017; IMF, 2017; UNCTAD, 2017; UNDP, 2015; UNIDO, 2016; World Bank, 2013 and the International Labor Organization (ILO) has launched a Global Commission on the Future of Work. Employment prospects have also come into sharp focus because of the contested experiences of "premature deindustrialization" (Palma, 2005; Rodrik, 2016) and weakening employment elasticities of growth. 1 There is currently significant and rising interest in these issues in the scholarly community (see e.g. Acemoglu & Restrepo, 2017; Arntz, Gregory, & Zierahn, 2016; Grace, Salvatier, Dafoe, Zhang, & Evans, 2017; Mishel & Bivens, 2017; Mokyr, Vickers, & Ziebarth, 2015; Roine & Waldenström, 2014) , in the reports of international agencies (see references above), and in the private sector too (Frey, Osborne, & Holmes, 2016; McKinsey Global Institute, 2017a PWC, 2017; World Economic Forum, 2017a) . Moreover, the topic has also captured the public interest, reflected by a mushrooming of media reports and popular science books on the issues (e.g. Avent, 2017; Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2011 , 2014 Harari, 2016; Srnicek, 2017 , to name but a few). Despite this increasing interest, the effects of 3 automation in particular remain highly contestable and understudied with respect to developing economies, given that most research has focused on high-income Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries such as the United States.
These are, however, not only OECD country issues (see discussion of Ahmed, 2017) . The World Bank (2016, p. 22f.) estimates that "the share of occupations that could experience significant automation is actually higher in developing countries than in more advanced ones, where many of these jobs have already disappeared." However, they note that the impact will be moderated by wage growth and the speed of technology adoption. There are numerous estimates of job displacement and much in the way of gray literature. However, these estimates are based on contestable assumptions and analysis of developing countries is often limited.
Furthermore, in contrast to a widespread narrative of technological unemployment, a more likely impact in the short-to-medium term at least is slow real-wage growth in low-and medium-skilled jobs as workers face competition from automation. This will itself hinder poverty reduction and likely put upward pressure on national inequality, weakening the poverty-reducing power of growth, and potentially placing the existing social contract under strain, or even possibly limiting the emergence of more inclusive social contracts. How developing countries should respond in terms of public policy is a crucial question, affecting not only middle-income developing countries, but even the very poorest countries given the automation trends in agriculture.
In light of the above, the objective of this paper is to: (i) survey the literature on automation; and in doing so (ii) discuss definitions and determinants of automation in the context of theories of economic development; (iii) assess the empirical estimates of employment-related impacts of automation; (iv) characterize the potential public policy responses to automation and (v) highlight areas for further research in terms of employment and economic development strategies in developing countries.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the trends in technology and discusses definitions and determinants of automation. Section 3 discusses the effect of automation on economic development and employment in developing countries from a theoretical perspective. Section 4 analyzes existing empirical forecasts of automatability and global patterns. Section 5 considers the public policy responses proposed. Finally, Section 6 concludes and highlights areas for further research in terms of employment and economic development strategies in developing countries.
Technological transformation: definitions, determinants, and development 2a. Technological trends
Stunning technological advances in robotics and artificial intelligence (AI) are being reported virtually on a daily basis: from the versatile mobile robots of the US engineering company Boston Dynamics to autonomous vehicles, vessels, and drones, to 3D-printed buildings and new breakthroughs in machine learning made by firms in the Silicon Valley and beyond. A growing number of empirical studies and several monographs have recently addressed the broader phenomenon of a "digital revolution" which is unfolding at high speed across OECD countries. Interest in the impact of technological change is by no means new of course. As the detailed empirical study of Leontief and Duchin (1984) is testimony to. Indeed, one can trace the subject back to the classical writings of David Ricardo (2010 Ricardo ( [1817 ) and Karl Marx (2012 [1867 ) or Joseph Schumpeter (1943) . The bulk of research on the economic implications of digital transformation has so far focused on advanced industrialized economies where the cost of labor is high and manufacturing shows a high degree of mechanization and productivity. Yet, the developing world is both affected by automation trends in high-income countries (HICs) and is itself catching up in terms of automation.
Indicative of this, the International Federation of Robotics (IFR) reports that Asia is currently the "strongest growth market" in a "significant rise in demand for industrial robots worldwide" (IFR, 2016, p. 11f.) . A double-digit growth trend includes not only China, Korea, and Japan but also emerging economies in South East Asia. The IFR (2016) estimates that by 2019, more than 250,000 units of multipurpose industrial robots will be installed in Asia on a yearly basis, with the main industries driving demand in robots being the automotive, electrical/electronics, metal, and machinery, as well as the rubber and plastics industries. This only captures the more easily measurable demand for robotics hardware and does not take account of the widespread use of software in the context of economic production. In some domains of automation, emerging economies are, in fact, ahead of many OECD countries, as the opening of Beijing's first driverless subway line in 2017 (Yan, 2017) or the popularity of the mobile phone-based financing platform M-Pesa in Kenya illustrate.
The digitalization and automation of economies raises the question of what lessons the developing world can draw from extant evidence. "Late developers" are facing the digital revolution considerably earlier and under different conditions than today's advanced economies. There is thus an increasing worry that "increased automation in low-wage countries, which have traditionally attracted manufacturing firms, could see them lose their cost advantage and potentially lose their ability of achieving rapid economic growth by shifting workers to factory jobs" which today's high-income countries used to have (Frey, Osborne, & Holmes, 2016) . Beyond the perceived threat of "technological unemployment," there are broader questions to be asked about how automation and digitalization influence economic development, employment growth, and structural transformation in developing countries. It may well be that labor displacement is less of an issue than real-wage growth as a result of the potential for automation, for example.
2b. Automation: definitions and determinants
The concept of automation is more difficult to define than might seem at first glance. Throughout history, humans have used tools to save time and effort when completing laborious tasks and thanks to innovation, such tools have gradually increased in sophistication. Today, the spectrum of "physical capital" ranges from simple manual tools to intelligent machines. One could thus argue that a "robot" is simply a highly advanced version of a tool which requires minimal (manual) human input for completing a task, although currently all machines still require considerable human intervention in their design, production, installation, and maintenance. The potential of AI is to move machines beyond human oversight, at least in everyday operation. An intelligent machine performs a set of complex tasks autonomously and may be capable of adapting to new and changing circumstances, i.e. "learning." Workhorse animals could be considered a biological equivalent of complex machines and have been used in transportation and agriculture since at least the agricultural revolution in 10,000 BC. Contemporary automation often tends to be associated with physical hardware such as industrial robots, but also includes software which plays a critical role in service automation (see Willcocks & Lacity, 2016 , Lacity & Willcocks 2018 . The wider process of structural economic change toward an automated economy has been referred to not only as a digital transformation but as the "fourth industrial revolution" (Schwab, 2016) .
Under what conditions might such a transformation or revolution take place? Technological feasibility is just one condition. Table 1 shows multiple criteria which the decision to automate involves: can a task be automated in a way that reliably produces a good or service at a specified level of quality? Is it profitable to automate that task? Is it legally possible for a firm to replace workers with machines? How do relevant stakeholders such as political groupings, particularly trade unions, and society at large, particularly consumers, respond to automation (and the potentially ensuing lay-offs)? Corresponding to these criteria, one could split the literature on automation into different theoretical approaches. Much recent research has focused on the first criterion in Table 1 : the technological feasibility of automation. Yet, automatable tasks do not necessarily or instantly get automated: one can observe a set of tasks currently being carried out both by humans and machines in different contexts and places. Consider, for instance, subway drivers and autonomous subways, supermarket cashiers, and self-checkout machines, university lecturers, and online courses. The coexistence of automated and non-automated modes of operation of the same task suggests that a narrowly technologically deterministic view is insufficient. There are less tangible-economic, political, social, and culturalreasons to be factored in. Such factors up until now often seem to have been neglected in research on automation, but could be particularly important in the context of developing countries. Such factors not only determine if automation occurs but the terms of automation vis-a-vis governing institutions.
Consider, for example, the case of Indonesia. In Indonesia, there have been numerous media reports related to automation and employment impacts (e.g. Deny, 2017; Jakarta Globe, 2017; Jefriando, 2017; Praditya, 2017; Saragih, 2017; Tempo, 2015 Tempo, , 2016a Tempo, , 2016b Tempo, , 2016c Tempo, , 2017 ; see also international press such as The Guardian, 2016) . The McKinsey Global Institute (2017c) estimates that around half of all jobs in Indonesia are automatable using existing technologies. One example is that motorway toll booths are being automated to an epayment system which has placed a question over 20,000 jobs, leading the Minister of 7
Finance to announce at the annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank that automation might create a case for a future universal basic income in Indonesia (Jakarta Post, 2017; Jefriando, 2017) .
While formerly each toll gate required five employees working in shifts to ensure vehicles had paid the road toll, the cashless system which is being rolled out runs entirely without human operators, thus speeding up the transaction process and reducing traffic congestion. Yet, as of early 2018, the toll road operator PT Jasa Marga asserts that "former tollgate keepers would instead be relocated to different positions within the company (…) and would keep their permanent employee status" (Aisyah, 2017) .
There have, indeed, so far, been no reports of mass lay-offs despite the electronic system being implemented. What could be the reason? First, it could be that, as implementation is still in an early stage, lay-offs may be a matter of time, and could happen in a gradual manner. The company may also reduce its future intake of new employees as a result. Second, it could be that, in line with the quote above, PT Jasa Marga, which is currently expanding its business, truly has the capacity to absorb 20,000 people in other sectors of its operation. If that is the case, this raises the important question as to whether by raising overall productivity and competitiveness, automation somehow allowed the company to expand. The latter would mean that automation has the double effect of reducing labor demand per unit of capital in one domain (e.g. manual toll collection) while raising labor demand in complementary domains (e.g. administrative or construction tasks).
Finally, there is a set of institutional reasons that could be an important explanatory factor as to why PT Jasa Marga-a state-owned enterprise and thus facing potential developmental obligations-has not laid off workers: political and social-norms pressures as well as legal constraints could be preventing the toll road operator from firing employees. One could imagine the political backlash of a state-owned enterprise making 20,000 people unemployed. There may be also concerns over strikes, attacks on the new toll-booth machinery, political interventions (including fears of the political replacement of senior management making such decisions) or negative media reports which demonstrably influence business decisions in part of wholly owned SOEs and to some extent in private companies too.
2c. Theoretical perspectives on automation
One could crudely distinguish the existing scholarly literature on automation and digitalization effects into two camps: first, there is an optimists' camp which essentially sees the "business as usual" of market dynamism at work. Technological change, they argue, has been an essential element of "modern economic growth" since the Industrial Revolution, and disruptive innovation has always been met with what Mokyr et al. (2015) call "technological anxiety." This has been the case at least since the arrival of the steam engine and the power loom. Simon Kuznets (1971) in his Nobel lecture argued that the most important feature of modern economic growth is a "combination of a high rate of aggregate growth with disrupting effects and new 'problems.'" Such disruption refers, in particular, to changes in the economic and social structure that technological innovation generates.
Joseph Schumpeter, key theorist of technological innovation, famously coined the notion of "creative destruction" for the "process of industrial mutation that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one" and called this the "essential fact about capitalism" (Schumpeter, 1943, p. 42f ., emphasis in original). Schumpeter's view on the economics of technology in the context of the Industrial Revolution preceded the neoclassical standard model of growth advanced by Solow (1956) . In his aggregate production function, Solow attributed all output growth not accounted for by increases in capital and/or labor to a broad category of "technical change" (Granstrand, 1994, p. 13) .
Scholars in this optimistic tradition thus tend to emphasize the historically demonstrated adaptive capacity of market economies to innovation and change with little emphasis on any temporary or permanent 'losers' in the process. Further, they argue that robots and computers take over repetitive, dangerous, unhealthy tasks, and so improve both the quality of work and of products and come with public health benefits. Importantly, automation decreases the cost of production and should thus, in a competitive market, lead to lower prices which benefit all consumers. Not only this, but "automation, by reducing wages relative to the rental rate of capital, encourages the creation of new labor-intensive tasks and generates a powerful self-correcting force towards stability" (Acemoglu & Restrepo, 2015, p. 41) . Optimists tend to suggest skills development for the labor force to allow a synergetic relationship of human and non-human work. 2 This is in keeping with Goldin and Katz' (2007) race between technology and skill supply itself drawing on the Tinbergen (1974; 1975) thesis. Further, they might advocate to reduce taxes on labor which would make labor relatively more competitive vis-à-vis robots.
The pessimists' camp, on the other hand, argues that "this time it's different": contemporary iterations of automation and digitalization are viewed as being part of a larger "digital revolution" (Avent, 2017) which is bringing about technologies that are more powerful and versatile than earlier iterations of the Industrial Revolution, and which will wholly or partially replace human brains rather than just the human muscle replaced by earlier technologies. The digital revolution, it is argued, is creating an array of intelligent, adaptive, general-purpose technologies with hitherto unseen labor-saving potentials for a widening group of tasks. This group of tasks increasingly includes complex, skill-intensive work and formerly hard-toautomate manual work like stitching. The relationship of human and non-human work is viewed as more and more substitutive rather than complementary. In this vein, an in-depth report of the Executive Office of the President of the United States (2016, p. 22) commissioned by Barack Obama warns that "the skills in which humans have maintained a comparative advantage are likely to erode over time as AI and new technologies become more sophisticated." DeLong (2015) argues too that, just like horses once used to dominate economic production, human labor currently dominates it, but that "peak human" may have been reached.
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Pessimists argue that automation is putting a downward pressure on wages (reflected in stagnating real wages) and an upward pressure on the rate of profit from capital investment. The detachment of productivity gains and wage growth observed since the 1970s in many OECD countries is brought forward as evidence. Automation, pessimists argue, may ultimately lead to job losses as technologies create fewer jobs than they eliminate ("technological unemployment") or create jobs in sectors which are potentially less desirable and productive ("premature deindustrialization"). Politically, the recommendations of the pessimist camp range from a "robot tax" to redistributive responses such as a universal basic income (with the latter potentially funded by the former) and questions of public versus private ownership of production and technology.
It is fair to say that the second, more pessimistic, camp has been increasingly visible in recent years. Yet, unemployment is generally not considered to be the main issue. With a view to the US, economic experts from the IGM Panel (2014) agree that automation has not (yet) markedly reduced employment but has rather led to a stagnation of median wages, a decoupling of real-wage growth from productivity growth, and a labor market polarization or "hollowing out" of middle-skill employment. Technology can depress or enhance wage growth depending on whether it substitutes or complements tasks (see for discussion, Acemoglu & Autor, 2011; Autor, Katz, & Kearney, 2004; Firpo, Fortin, & Lemieux, 2011; Goos & Manning, 2007 ).
Further, it should not be taken as given that lower skilled work will necessarily be automated, but it can contribute to a "missing middle" whereby most jobs are low or high skilled, and those in-between are relatively more susceptible to automation, or whereby employment expansion in those middle-skill jobs is weaker than that of low and high-skilled jobs (see Autor, Levy, & Murnane, 2003) . The problem thus may not be so much that jobs are lost, rather than that other types of jobs expand in number. People are being driven into the jobs below their skill level, with either lower or slower growing wages than the middle-skill jobs that previously existed.
A key question is what happens to productivity growth in any given country. In short, who 'captures' the productivity growth in terms of capital or labor and the functional distribution of income. And how what is captured is then distributed within the capital share (which may be distributed between reinvestment, dividend payments, reserves building, or other activity e.g. rents), or within the labor share which may be distributed between employment growth, real-wage growth, or social security entitlements (see discussion of Atkinson, 2009; Francese & Mulas-Granados, 2015) . This matters from an individual income inequality perspective, as reductions in the labor share of income are correlated with rising income inequality between individuals (see for detailed discussion, Chapter 3 of IMF, 2017).
Automation and structural transformation in developing countries 3a. Characteristics of developing countries
Developing countries have special characteristics (vis-à-vis OECD countries): they tend to be labor-abundant and have higher rates of population growth than OECD countries. Large proportions of the population are often relatively unskilled and tertiary education is still comparatively limited even in upper middle income developing countries. Compared to advanced high-income countries, they have a larger agricultural sector, and lower employment and value-added shares in industry and manufacturing, as well as a large informal service sector again not only in the world's poorest countries but even in upper middle income countries. Production in such economies is less capital-intensive and productivity levels are thus lower than in high-income countries.
A number of developing countries have substantially shifted economic value-added activity from agriculture and resources to manufacturing and service sectors. For developing countries with such characteristics, a set of questions arises in the context of automation (that are different to the world's very poorest countries): What if industrial production can increasingly be carried out with minimal human labor input? What if robots in high-income countries start to compete with cheap labor? Is it plausible that there could be a disintegration of global value chains via "reshoring," i.e. the repatriation of formerly outsourced production to high-income countries? What if the service sector-where currently the largest share of labor is absorbed in many middle income developing countries-goes through dramatic shifts of labor productivity, thanks to innovations in software and AI? Does automation exacerbate a much-debated "middle-income trap" if it exists at all and thus impede catch-up development? Are there new sectors of economic activity emerging which promise decent employment opportunities for large populations rather than economic growth accompanied by weak employment growth? These questions point towards the importance of situating the role of technology in broader theories of economic development.
3b. Disrupted development? The role of technological change in long-run economic development
The neoclassical standard model of growth attributes a key role to technological change in long-run economic growth. In the Solow (1956) model, growth can be achieved either via an increase in the inputs of production, e.g. an expansion of the labor force or an increase in the capital intensity, or it can happen via greater efficiency in the combination of inputs that generates a larger output. The latter route is known as the dynamics of total factor productivity (TFP) and innovation in automation technologies is generally considered an important factor in raising the TFP.
Summers (2013) considers a modification of the neoclassical two-factor production function in which output is created via both a complementary and a substitutive use of capital and labor (see for discussion Atkinson & Bourguignon, 2014, p. xilx) . Capital will be "deployed in these two uses to the point where their marginal productivity is the same" (Summers, 2013, p. 4 ) and a certain mix of capital and labor will result. Summers highlights three implications of labor-saving capital use: (i) production opportunities are augmented and output thus increases; (ii) wage rates fall; and (iii) returns to capital rise. Atkinson and Bourguignon thus argue:
We can therefore tell a story of macroeconomic development where initially the Solow model applies (…). A rising capital-labor ratio leads to rising wages and a falling rate of return. Beyond a certain point however (…) [labor-substituting capital use] begins to be positive. We then see further growth in the economy, as capital per head rises (…). There is no longer any gain to wage-earners, since they are increasingly being replaced by robots/automation. What is more, the capital share rises, independently of the elasticity of substitution.
[The modified Solow model] highlights the central distributional dilemma: that the benefits from growth now increasingly accrue through rising profits. (Atkinson & Bourguignon, 2014, p. xilx) In line with the argument of a distribution dilemma, Roine and Waldenström (2014, p. 79 )-though they are skeptical of any "mechanical relationship between inequality and industrialization or technological change"-argue that: "the technological development starting in the 1970s constitute[s] the start of a shift, not from agriculture to industry as in Kuznets' original story, but from traditional industry to an ICT-intensive sector that initially rewards a small part of the population, but eventually will spread, bringing inequality down." 3
There is thus a theoretical case that automation may be linked to income inequality and wage stagnation. Is there also a case for it leading to technological unemployment? The Solow model and its iterations suggest greater output (i.e. supply) due to automation which should translate into lower prices under conditions of competition. Lower prices in turn should lead to greater quantities demanded which necessitate more net employment of humans.
So, the net effect of using labor-saving technology could still be labor-increasing domestically. It may, however, not be if we took the Summers' model to its extreme: this would mean assuming a perfectly labor-saving production function where labor drops out entirely as a factor of production. In that case, output would be produced solely by nonhuman production factors.
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Solow himself was skeptical of such a scenario. In a book on unemployment in the US written in the 1960s, he noted that "rather spectacular scientific and engineering achievements" have led many "to the conclusion that there is a kind of revolution in progress, connected with the advance of automation" (Solow, 1964, p. 7 ). Yet, he doubted "that the clichés about automation and structural unemployment are very productive in analyzing the problem or bringing the remedy any closer" (ibid., p. 40) and he is particularly skeptical that automation calls for specific policy responses or a reorganization of the economic framework.
Of course, as noted above, not all labor is equally easy to substitute with machines. The dominant view has been that technology is skills-complementing or skills-biased (see Tinbergen, 1974 Tinbergen, , 1975 . Empirically, models predicting a "skills premium" and rising market inequality due to automation are pervasive (see Acemoglu & Autor, 2011; Autor et al., 2004; Goldin & Katz, 2007; Katz & Autor, 1999; Katz & Murphy, 2013) . Others have argued, though, that technological change does not necessarily have to be skills-biased and inequalityincreasing in every case (see Roine & Waldenström, 2014) .
The neoclassical growth model is a one-sector model and thus indifferent to the role of structural change in driving growth as Lewis (1954) intended, in his vision of economic development as a transfer of labor from a low-productivity, "traditional" sector to a higher productivity, "modern" sector. Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi (2014) , argue empirically that the sectoral composition of economic activity is key to understanding economic development. McMillan and Rodrik (2011, p. 1) , also, in taking sectoral and aggregate labor productivity data empirically show that the transfer of labor and other inputs to higher productive activity is a driver of economic development, as Lewis hypothesized. However, they go on to note that structural change can in fact be growth-enhancing or growth-reducing, depending on the reallocation of that labor. 4 Assuming technological labor-substitution, what can we say about potential implications for structural economic transformation, i.e. the reallocation of economic resources across sectors with different levels of productivity?
The dual economy model of Lewis (1954) is based, as noted, on a traditional or subsistence sector and a modern sector, where in the former, there is a surplus of unproductive labor that is sustained by receiving an equal share of the total product for reasons of traditional/family-based values. Lewis argued that the driver of economic development was a sectoral movement of labor from the "traditional" or "subsistence" or "non-capitalist" sector (of low productivity, low wage, priced to average product not marginal product, and 13 thus widespread disguised unemployment) to the "modern" or "capitalist" sector (of higher productivity, and where wages are set by productivity in the 'subsistence sector'.
A critical factor is the existence of surplus labor in the traditional sector. Because of this, wages are set just above subsistence across the whole economy, leading to the transfer of labor over time from the traditional to the modern sector, and the capture of labor productivity gains to capitalists as profits, as these are the source of growth via reinvestment. The floor for wages is institutionally set at subsistence. When surplus labor disappears, an integrated labor market and economy emerge, and wages will then start to rise.
The Lewis model was intended as a critique of the neoclassical approach in that labor is available to the modern or capitalist sector of an economy not in a perfectly elastic supply but upward sloping rather than flat, and with a distinction between surplus-producing labor and subsistence labor (the latter of which was a negligible source of net profits for reinvestment, which Lewis saw as the driver for growth). Diao, McMillan, Rodrik, and Kennedy (2017, pp. 3-4) seek to link the structural dualism of Lewis with the neoclassical model, by arguing that the neoclassical model shows the growth process within the modern sector and the dual model shows the relationship between sectors. In short, the emergence of a modern sector with higher and competitively paid wages, and where profits are reinvested by capital owners, creates a pull force. This pull force attracts labor from the traditional sector. After a period of labor exchange via migration, an inter-sectoral equilibrium is reached, and wages are equalized between sectors.
Following Lewis' dual economy, we could divide up an economy into two sectors: an automation-prone sector (APS), consisting of jobs that are easy to perform by machines, and an automation-resistant sector (ARS), consisting of jobs that are hard to perform by machines (Figure 1 ). 5 The former would, for instance, include simple manual routine tasks like lifting, drilling, and so forth and the latter would, for instance, include creative work involving faceto-face interaction.
With a view to the Lewis model of economic development, one could say that automation creates "unlimited supplies of artificial labor" in the APS. The increasing use of robots is thus equivalent to labor force growth in the APS. Arguably, the sheer capacity alone to build and deploy robots creates a new kind of "robot reserve army" in the APS, limiting the bargaining power and wages of labor in that sector. If automation is (technologically, legally, politically, and socially) feasible, the labor force will thus gradually be pushed from the APS into the ARS. There would be automation-driven structural change taking place.
In other words, automation itself constitutes a supply shock which shifts the labor supply curve in the APS to the right, and thus reduces the equilibrium wage in that sector (as well as in the ARS to the extent that labor can be absorbed in that sector). If the unit cost of automated production falls below the reservation wage of workers, a labor surplus is created. Automation thus frees up resources for the completion of non-automatable work. 6 The surplus can either be absorbed by the ARS or, in case that is not possible, can lead to technological unemployment. Like in the Lewis model, the functional distribution of income changes in favor of capital owners.
Is there a "turning point"? In Lewis' standard model, a turning point is reached when surplus labor has fully migrated from the traditional or subsistence sector to the modern industrial sector, and wages start rising in the traditional sector due to an emerging labor shortage. In the model outlined here, there is, arguably, no such turning point. The supply of "artificial labor," i.e. automation, is genuinely unlimited, as it does not depend on the dynamics of demographic growth. In that case, human labor in the APS is fully displaced by machines and only an ARS remains. The ARS is itself, of course, not static but is defined by the technological frontier of the time. Technological innovation then gives rise to the shift of the frontier and thus re-emergence of a new APS.
The question then becomes: What industries and tasks comprise the ARS and the APS, respectively? And is demand for the ARS large enough to allow full employment at decent wages? Regarding the first question, it would arguably be a mistake to suspect the location of the ARS primarily in newly emerging post-industrial sectors such as telecommunication or finance. Rather, the little amount of human work performed in modern agriculture is equally as automation-resistant by today's technological standards as resilient jobs in the industrial and the service sectors. 7 The service sector is generally considered to contribute strongly to the ARS, as it involves plenty of non-routine work involving social interactions. The current occupational structure of an economy reflects past (expectations of) automatability.
Regarding the second question, there could be a dilemma whereby a productivity boost in the APS (e.g. in agriculture) creates surplus labor, but the ARS (e.g. the industrial sector) is not able to fully absorb it. So-called premature deindustrialization could be due to such "Lewis 2.0" dynamics: workers might be moving to the service sector because the manufacturing sector has no demand for (unskilled) labor. It is fully imaginable from today's point of view that the industrial sector will at some point be absorbing an equally small number of workers as today's extractive and agricultural sectors are. A set of highly 6 Baumol's "unbalanced growth" model similarly envisaged a labor transition from one to the other sector and aggregate stagnant labor productivity as a result (Baumol, Blackman, & Wolff, 1985; Baumol, 1967 ; see also Ngai & Pissarides, 2017 for a contemporary iteration of the model). Autor and Dorn (2013) , based on a spatial equilibrium model, posit a reallocation of low-skill labor into service occupations (a phenomenon they call "employment polarization" which then entails wage polarization). 7 Of course, both the existence of agricultural subsidies and trade of agricultural products makes an assessment more difficult. Without subsidies, the sector might employ even fewer people. Conversely, OECD countries are not self-sufficient and depend on labor in foreign countries to produce food for export to OECD countries.
productive manufacturing clusters would then produce most of the physical goods there is demand for, while almost all human labor demand would remain in the service sector. If that is the case, this would indicate that the digital revolution creates problems for analysis based on very broad economic sectors such as "services": Castells (2010, p. 244) criticizes analysis based on very broad economic sectors for three flaws: (i) the extreme heterogeneity of the service sector creates a "statistically obsolete category" which (ii) underestimates the "revolutionary nature of new information technologies" and (iii) the diversity of advanced societies and interdependence with the global economy from which different employment and occupational structures follow.
The historical productivity revolution in agriculture (or the "Green Revolution" in developing countries) shows how transformative and labor-saving technological change can be. In the British census of 1841, 22 percent of citizens were registered as being in agricultural employment whereas this number has dropped to below 1 percent in the present (Office for National Statistics, 2013). Agricultural shares in the developing world, though considerably higher, have also fallen rapidly (to an extent that Eastwood, Kirsten, and Lipton (2007) have argued that developing countries underwent "premature agriculturalization").
Green revolutions have brought drastic productivity gains, allowing and incentivizing the reallocation of labor toward other-often hitherto non-existent-economic activities and sectors. Many argue that technological leaps in agriculture allowed Western countries to escape a "Malthusian trap" which had kept living standards stagnant throughout most of pre-industrial history (see Clark, 2008) . Had there been policies to prevent the agricultural revolution because of job losses, the industrial revolution may not have unfolded in the same way. Historical structural change thus holds lessons, both for how hitherto unknown sectors can absorb labor from shrinking sectors, and what potential risks are involved in counteracting structural change.
The Industrial Revolution provides another point of reference for the digital transformation. Avent (2017, p. 162) argues that the digital revolution is set to repeat the experience of the Industrial Revolution which "bypassed the developing world for long decades." In Avent's view, integration into global supply chains which enabled rapid catch-up growth in the South ("export-led industrialization") was a transitory phenomenon that will soon be replaced by both "reshoring"-the repatriation of outsourced production-or will be limited to small high-tech clusters in developing economies (cf. Yusuf, 2017) . Such clusters might not create the large-scale job opportunities that broad-based industrial activity provided historically. According to Avent (2017, p. 163) , the digital revolution will thus "make it more difficult in the future for poor countries to repeat the performance of the past twenty years. Once again, rich economies will enjoy a near-monopoly on the sorts of social capital required to generate a rich-world income" such as democracy, property rights, and accountable governance. One could call this the threat of a "disruption" of the catch-up development process. 8
3c. The fourth industrial reserve army
What can be said about the characteristics of a labor surplus? Lewis (1954) , in his seminal text on unlimited supplies of labor, saw himself working "in the classical tradition" of Karl Marx and Adam Smith.
In Das Kapital, Karl Marx (2012 [1867 ) posited that there is a "progressive production of a relative surplus population or Industrial Reserve Army" (ibid., p. 274) as both a condition and an outcome of the capitalist mode of production. 9 Overpopulation, in Marx' view, provides a "mass of human material always ready for exploitation" (ibid., p. 276), holding the wages of the active labor force in check and thus feeding a process of capital accumulation. Throughout this process of accumulation, the productiveness of labor constantly expands with growing employment of machinery. This accelerating capital accumulation process leads, in Marx' view, to a "constant transformation of a part of the laboring population into unemployed or half-employed hands" (ibid., p. 278), i.e. a surplus population relative to the labor demand of industry (rather than an absolute overpopulation in a Malthusian sense).
Marx had a clear interest in the relationship of technology and labor in the production process, and he specifically points to the "automatic factories" where "only a very small number continue to find employment," while the majority who get laid off form a "floating surplus population" (ibid., p. 281). He speaks of workers being degraded to the estranging status of an "appendage of a machine" (ibid.) and, in Das Kapital, Marx sees the process of technology-driven capitalistic development as an "accumulation of misery" (ibid.). This line of argument is stark techno-pessimism.
Although Lewis' conception of surplus labor as a population defined "relatively to capital and natural resources" sounds Marxian (and also Malthusian), there are some differences in that Lewis really means disguised rather than actual unemployment. In other words, Lewis' surplus population receive wages and, moreover, these wages exceed their marginal productivity (cf. Lewis, 1954, p. 141f) . 10 Marx (2012, p. 283) , on the other hand, distinguished multiple forms of surplus labor: a "floating" form where workers have to constantly change employers; a "latent" form of precarious agricultural (under)employment; a "stagnant" form characterized by irregular employment at minimal wages; and a "pauperist form" which is made up of criminals and "dangerous classes."
Lewis' conception of surplus labor thus resembles that of Marx' latent surplus, whereas he explicitly disagrees with the notion of productivity-driven labor surplus:
Marx offered a third source of labor to add to the reserve army, namely the unemployment generated by increasing efficiency. (…) Nowadays we reject this argument on empirical grounds. It is clear that the effect of capital accumulation in the past has been to reduce the size of the reserve army, and not to increase it, so we have lost interest in arguments about what is "theoretically" possible. (Lewis, 1954, p. 145) Lewis was thus a technological optimist. Indeed, if the industrialized/urban/capitalistic sector in his model is also assumed to produce surplus labor, the model of labor exchange would arguably break down.
Marx and Lewis concur that the reserve army is central to capital accumulation in modern capitalism. Lewis (1954, p. 145) , though, is much more sanguine about this process as he sees the "expansion of new industries or new employment opportunities without any shortage of unskilled labor." When in Section 3b, we proposed to understand automation along the lines of a "Lewis 2.0 model," the idea was thus to incorporate elements of both Marxian and Lewisian thinking: in light of current technological development, we may not want to reject Marx' views on automation "on empirical grounds" quite as categorically as Lewis did-even if the impact of reserve army dynamics are more likely wage pressures in the APS rather than the drastic employment-destroying effects of the "automatic factory" that Marx had in mind.
Lewis, on the other hand, may have been right in considering surplus labor primarily as an engine of structural change within a dualistic economy framework. Labor that is "set free" may get permanently absorbed in the ARS. The question then is whether such modern-day automation-driven structural change has equally benign effects (particularly under conditions of global competition and an international division of labor), as Lewis assumed traditional structural change to have, within select labor-abundant Asian developing countries. 11
Existing empirical forecasts of the employment effects of automation
It is an empirical question if and in which sectors automation reduces labor demand. As was discussed, automation could reduce employment if the ARS has a low demand for labor. But if productivity gains lead to lower prices and thus higher quantities demanded, net job effects could be positive. Furthermore, the demand for new labor-intensive work could rise as the cost of labor falls relative to capital. Many would argue that the very problem of developing countries is that there is too little, rather than too much, automation and thus lower labor productivity. Table 2 presents a further layer to the "Lewis 2.0" model of economic development in an analytical framework to consider automation effects on employment within the two sector model presented earlier. One could speak of an adaptable and a non-adaptable labor force (defined, for instance, by the skills level). One could then hypothesize the existence of two opposing forces in automation-driven structural change in the developing world: (i) labor is cheaper than in high-income countries, thus more competitive vis-à-vis machines, and there is thus less of an incentive to automate; (ii) conversely, given widespread low-skilled manual routine work, work tasks that are prevalent in developing countries are easier to automate from a technological viewpoint. In other words, the APS will likely be larger in developing countries. Considering the taxonomy that was proposed earlier, this means that automation is arguably more technologically but less economically feasible.
Empirical estimates and forecasts of the potential impact of automation across the world are presented in Table 3 (the table is non-exhaustive). It is immediately evident from the studies in Table 3 that there is no consensus on jobs impacts and substantial variation in current estimates. US "Economy has repeatedly proven itself capable of handling this scale of change," but jobs at risk "concentrated among lower-paid, lower skilled, and less-educated workers" (ibid., p. 2).
Acemoglu & Restrepo (2017) US "One additional robot per thousand workers (…) reduces aggregate employment to population ratio by 0.34 percentage points and aggregate wages by 0.5 percent" (ibid., p. 36).
Atkinson & Wu (2017) US Labor market disruption occurring at its lowest rate since the Civil War.
IMF (2017) Advanced economies
Technological progress "explains about half the overall decline [of the labor income share] in advanced economies, with a larger negative impact on the earnings of middle-skilled workers."
Mishel & Bivens (2017) US No evidence that automation leads to joblessness or inequality.
PWC (2017) OECD Automation could replace 38% jobs in US, 35% in Germany and 30% in the UK and 21% in Japan by early 2030s.
Studies of developing countries
Chandy (2017) Developing countries "Automation is likely to replace jobs even faster in developing countries than in industrial ones" (ibid., p. 15).
Chang & Huynh (2016) South East Asia 56% of jobs are at high risk of automation in Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. Developing countries "Developing countries are highly susceptible to the expanding scope of automation" (ibid., p. 18).
Frey and Rahbari (2016) OECD and Ethiopia, India and China
China will lose 77% of jobs to automation, India 69%, Ethiopia 85% and OECD average 57% jobs lost.
World Bank (2016) Developing Countries
Two-thirds of all jobs susceptible to automation (1.8bn jobs), but the effects are moderated by lower wages and slower technology adoption.
Avent (2017) Developing Countries "New technology seems to be making life harder for the emerging world" (ibid., p. 171).
World Economic Forum (2017b) Africa 41% of all work activities in South Africa susceptible to automation, 44% in Ethiopia, 46% in Nigeria and 52% in Kenya.
ADB (2018) Asia
In the period of 2005-2015 in 12 Asian economies there were 101m job losses per annum due to 'modern machine tools and ICT equipment' which were offset by 134m jobs created due to higher demand for goods and services (ibid., p. 77-78). Estimates range from alarming scenarios, according to which there is a "50% chance of AI outperforming humans in all tasks within 45 years" (Grace et al., 2017 , emphasis added), on the one hand, to contrasting claims of there being "no evidence that automation leads to joblessness" (Mishel & Bivens, 2017, p. 1) , and the sarcastic recommendation that "everyone should take a deep breath" (Atkinson & Wu, 2017, p. 23 ).
Global studies
The seminal study in the recent automation literature is that of Frey and Osborne (2013) for the US, and subsequent studies have reproduced and refined their methodology. They conclude that almost half of the US employment is 'at risk'. In contrast, Arntz et al. (2016) occupies a middle ground in terms of optimism. The authors argue with some plausibility for a "task-based" rather than an-inevitably over-simplified-"occupation-based" approach to estimating automatability risk. Arntz et al. draw on data from an international survey of adult skills conducted across OECD countries which contains data on the tasks performed for each type of job. The authors use these data to impute a score of automatability, as well as the size of the population at "high risk" of automation. Interestingly, Russia's occupational structure is deemed least automatable of the 21 countries considered, whereas Germany and Austria top the rank. Put differently, the country with the lowest gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (and per worker) in the data set considered by Arntz et al. (2016) shows the highest resilience to automation. Generally, there is no consistent relationship with GDP per capita and their score of automatability, though, in this OECD data set (which is thus based on a selection of structurally similar economies).
The McKinsey Global Institute (2017c) provides estimates of employment that is susceptible to automation for 52 countries, which is the most comprehensive global data set we know of. Overall, McKinsey is considerably more pessimistic with their estimates of mean automatability, being on average 10 percentage points above that of Arntz et al. Their estimates are more pessimistic in every country and considerably more pessimistic specifically regarding non-OECD countries. 12 Across Western OECD countries only, the estimates of Arntz et al. and McKinsey are, in fact, closely aligned (r 2 =0.5). Their automatability estimates of industrialized economies such as Russia, Korea, and Japan, though, differ significantly, with McKinsey being considerably more pessimistic.
Another recent global estimate comes from the World Bank (2016) who provide data for 40 countries and are yet more pessimistic, with average estimates lying 20 percentage points above the McKinsey estimate. The overlap of country coverage between the World Bank and the McKinsey estimates is small (nine countries); among those, the shared variance is relatively low at about 12 percent (Table 4 shows selected countries). In addition to automatability estimates, the World Bank also provides adjusted estimates which take into account the different speeds of technology diffusion across countries. In the next section, we explore the McKinsey Global Institute (2017c) and World Bank (2016) data in more detail. 13
4a. Empirical patterns of automatability and economic development
Instead of focusing on the levels of automatability per se, which remains fairly contentious we next discus the relationship of automatability and economic development. 14 13 There are further data sets of IMF (2017) and UNCTAD (2017) which we do not have access to at time of writing. 14 We may overemphasise the technical feasibility angle in this section given the data we use which leads us to an inverse relationship between automatability and per capita income. At the current cost of automation, there is a positive relationship and the curve may turn into an inverted U as costs keeps falling and all jobs in developed countries have been automated, before eventually becoming negative; the question of course is how long away 'eventually' is. Thus our assessment may be too pessimistic. The first observation to make (and one that was also made by is that automatability estimates show a relationship with the level of GNI per capita across countries in global comparison (Figure 2 ). Both sets of estimates are highly significantly (p<0.01) negatively correlated with gross national income (GNI) per capita. Thus, the richer an economy, the less automatable the labor force. That said, McKinsey's estimates range from a minimum of 41 percent to a maximum of 56 percent and the World Bank's from 55 percent to 85 percent, so even the most resilient countries could still see significant labor market disruption. It is interesting to note that the McKinsey Global Institute assigns the lowest automatability estimates to Kuwait and South Africa, the former an entirely oil-fueled Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) economy with practically no unemployment, and the latter having one of the highest unemployment rates and most segregated labor markets in the world. Overall, the median estimates of the McKinsey Global Institute for HICs (n=27) is 47, whereas the median for low-income countries (LICs) and lower middle-income countries (LMICs) (n=13) is 51.
It is worth at this point considering the structural characteristics of economies. Figure 3 reproduces the familiar cross-country pattern across three sectors, showing that rich countries generally have very low levels of employment in agriculture and high levels of service sector employment, with the reverse being the case for developing countries. The industry share of employment is uncorrelated with GNI per capita (p>0.05) from a crosscountry perspective.
Given this overall structural pattern, what then is the relationship between automatability and sectoral characteristics? Figure 4 shows that the pattern is similar, though somewhat less pronounced, to the pattern of GNI per capita and automatability. The service sector share, in particular, is a strong predictor of both McKinsey's and the World Bank's automatability estimates. The more agrarian an economy is, the larger the population performing tasks that machines could theoretically perform. Service sector 27 We can thus say, assuming the automatability estimates are reasonable, that the labor force of more service sector-based, richer economies tends to be less replaceable compared to more agriculture-based, poorer economies. This pattern is intuitive and is explained by the complexity and creativity of service-sector work and the amount of face-to-face human interaction involved in it. If we break down the relationship of sectoral employment by level of GNI per capita (Figure 5) , the above-mentioned pattern largely holds. Among HICs, there is no relationship between agriculture and automatability simply because there is almost no employment in agriculture. Industrial work is more automatable and service-sector work less automatable across both country groupings, so the level of economic development does not moderate that sectoral relationship. What does this mean for the future of economic development and structural transformation? Holding all else constant, sectoral differences in the replaceability of labor will sustain a pressure for both further deindustrialization and agriculturalization. This is not a new phenomenon: in fact, the cross-country pattern of sectoral employment shares shown earlier Service sector 29 in Figure 3 and reproduced in Figure 6 to compare 1991 and 2014 (fitted lines) shows a surprising degree of continuity over time. What appears to be happening, though, is an expansion of service-sector employment in the richest countries, and a reduction in the share of industrial work compared to the early nineties (this pattern is corroborated by Wood, 2017) . In line with this, Chandy (2017, p. 14) speculates that "China may be one of the last countries to ride the wave of industrialization to prosperity." Generally, most of the global cross-country variability of employment shares is found toward the low end of the GNI per capita, whereas countries above a per capita GNI of 20,000 look structurally very similar, i.e. are highly service-based and thus face lower automatability. In general, it is only in the poorest countries that a considerable proportion of labor is in agriculture. However, even in middle income developing countries such as Indonesia and Thailand, a third of the labor force remains in agriculture. Agriculture employs only a few per cent of labor force in wealthy countries. This suggests that in contrast to OECD countries, many jobs in developing countries have likely been automatable for a long time. 
Automation, politics, and public policy
The discussion thus far points towards the potential for major shifts in employment due to automation. This process will likely have socio-political consequences. Macroeconomic and labor market dynamics determine the quality, quantity, and distribution of citizens' employment opportunities and thus of their wages, living standards, and class status. Such socioeconomic characteristics in turn have a profound bearing on sentiments of (in)security, relative deprivation, and societal equity which can influence political preferences and ultimately political outcomes. There is a large body of literature providing evidence for a causal relationship of this sort (see e.g. for the impact on electoral politics: Anderson, 2000; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000 ; for the impact on political preferences: Finseraas, 2009; Mughan, 2018 ; see also the substantial literature on economic and class voting, as well as the literature on economic modernization and political values, e.g. Inglehart & Welzel, 2005) .
The wider interest in the role of work and (un)employment as underpinnings of political agency goes back to early empirical social research (e.g. Jahoda, Lazarsfeld, & Zeisel, 1933) , and even to the classical social theory of Karl Marx and Max Weber. As technological change influences labor market dynamics, an important field of research is the examination of modernization losers as political catalysts: specifically, so-called "technological anxiety" and resistance to innovation (see Mokyr, 1998; Mokyr et al., 2015) ; the relationship of economic inequality, and political polarization and extremism (see Pontusson & Rueda, 2008) ; and the political implications of deindustrialization (see Iversen & Cusack, 2000) .
Major political implications imply public policy responses. One can characterize policy responses to automation (Figure 7) . First, there is a class of policies that try to attenuate or reverse the automation trend. Among those, there are "quasi-Luddite" measures such as taxes and regulation that make domestic automation more (or even prohibitively) costly. Countries could also follow a strategy of what one could call "robot-substituting industrialization" where they impose tariffs on inputs/imports with non-human-produced contents. The problem with such strategies is that protectionism of labor is difficult to implement in an open economy. Luddite policies tend to be in conflict with integration into a globalized competitive market, as they assume that the economy can somehow be insulated from competition with automated production elsewhere. The mirror image of making automation costlier would be to reduce the costs of labor, e.g. by reducing income taxes or social insurance contributions, by reducing minimum wages, or costly labor regulations. The question is how desirable and politically feasible such strategies are.
Second, there is a class of "coping strategies" for the trend toward automation. The most prominent one is to develop the skills of the labor force and (re)train workers in the APS. A widespread policy recommendation is to invest in skills and thus move the labor force away from automatable routine tasks. The problem with this approach is that (i) it is not clear what skills will be automation-resistant for a sufficient time to make the skills investment worthwhile and (ii) whether upskilling is at all realistic given the required time and monetary investment. Competition with currently available technology increasingly seems to require a tertiary education which is still very rare throughout the developing world. Given that even advanced industrialized countries are struggling to keep their labor forces competitive, the success of a skills development strategy alone remains questionable.
A second coping strategy would be to provide economic transition support as well as safety nets, unemployment insurance, or wage subsidies. This approach addresses the distributional skew which automation may create. However, such transfers presuppose the existence of a productive ARS in the first place, from which profits can be siphoned off for redistribution. In the absence of the existence of such a sector, there may be a case for the provision of international aid to support basic income guarantees or automation adjustment assistance overseas.
In many countries, one could say that the coping strategy adopted so far has been to invest in currently labor-intensive sectors such as infrastructure and construction. A-risky but potentially inevitable-long-term coping strategy for developing countries would be to anticipate automation trends and to try to (further) develop a productive post-industrial sector. If industrialization begins to look increasingly unattractive due to reshoring of hitherto outsourced production in value chains, countries would be well advised not to invest in the costly creation of manufacturing clusters but rather in the growth of a longterm ARS. Such an ARS could, for example, involve the social, education and health-care sectors, and some forms of tourism, and infrastructure construction which are generally considered resilient despite increasing service automation. The problem with such an approach is that highly productive and tradeable services are skills-intensive, and nontradeable services (such as social care, personal services, etc.) are not (yet) highly valueadding, may not be sufficiently scalable, and may generally be too heterogenous to be targeted by post-industrial policies, in a similar way that industrial policies targeted the emergence of industrial clusters. 
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Conclusions
This paper has surveyed the literature on automation and in doing so discussed definitions and determinants of automation in the context of theories of economic development, assessed the empirical estimates of employment-related impacts of automation and outlined the public policy responses to automation. We have shown that the contentious debate on automation is not new. Its origins can be traced back to classical political economy and thinking on economic development, and both the optimistic and pessimistic camps that have emerged over time have made valid points. To understand the employment dynamics of automation-driven structural change, the paper used a simple framework in the tradition of W. Arthur Lewis (and William Baumol) and with recognition of Marx' reserve army thinking.
In conclusion, we would argue that the main implications of advances in technology and automation are not mass lay-offs and technological unemployment necessarily (though both are plausible under certain scenarios) in developing countries, but an increasing pressure toward deindustrialization and agriculturalization. Empirically, the impact of automation is complex to estimate, and most studies have tended toward technologically deterministic approaches. Theoretically, the net effect on jobs could be both positive (lower prices lead to higher quantities demanded and thus more labor demand) and also negative (displaced labor is not absorbed in the ARS). Manual routine work, especially in agriculture, remains prevalent throughout the developing world, which is an important concern. Overall, the focus of many studies on employment is arguably too narrow, and there are broader questions about the impact of the digital revolution on structural change and strategies of economic development to be addressed.
The developing world could well experience more negative impacts from automation than the developed world, since (i) there are substantially more jobs to be lost through laborsubstituting technical progress than in the rich world and (ii) new industries may stop outsourcing production to the developing world. We argue that it is likely that real wages may stagnate rather than unemployment rise per se in the developing world which implies socio-political consequences. This line of argument is, of course, particularly tailored to the characteristics of labor-abundant open economies and may not be generalizable beyond that.
One way or another, technological innovation is causing disruption and thus poses questions for public policy. We would express skepticism about the often-voiced call for skills-based development strategies alone. Social safety nets, on the other hand, do seem to offer one strategy; yet, to the extent that they raise the cost of labor, could exacerbate the trend toward technological substitution. In this context, discussions about a living-wage level universal basic income (UBI) somewhat smack of a "first-world problem": to be able to worry about the redistribution of profits due to productivity gains assumes the luxury of jurisdiction over those profits, which many developing countries may not have. So, what to do?
We see the policy space for developing countries split between coping and containment strategies and constrained by globalization. Protectionist trade policy in the North could well accelerate reshoring, and hence the impacts on the developing world that this paper discusses. In the long term, utopian as it may seem now, the moral case for an global UBI-style redistribution framework financed by profits from high-productivity production clusters in high-income countries may become overwhelming, but it is difficult to see how such a framework would be politically enacted. For the moment, in any case, workers in developing countries are facing an uphill battle against a growing "Robot Reserve Army."
Avenues for future research are numerous. Here we simply set out a range of indicative questions. The core research question is, given a context of automation and digitalization, how are developing countries to increase the quantity and quality of employment growth?
The core question can be broken down into three clusters of (indicative) Understanding the more precise impacts of automation on the economic development of developing countries can only be well understood if such questions are urgently pursued.
In conclusion, we would make three points. First, automation is challenging the competitive advantage of low-cost labor of late developers. Second, many developing countries have a vulnerable labor force in terms of wage stagnation and premature deindustrialization could loom. However, unemployment is not (yet) the problem. Third, we need to ask different policy and research questions and be concerned about the jobs impact of technology and the political economy of automation rather than just automatability in principle. In that vein the Lewis model and surplus labor theory could once more help us understand the dynamics of economic development and structural transformation.
